

McKennaMUN VIII Background Guide



African Union

**April 4-5 2020
Claremont McKenna
College**



**McKENNA
MUN**

DIRECTOR'S LETTER

Dear Delegates,

My name is Sam Bogen, and I am very excited to be your chair for the African Union at McKennaMUN VIII. I am originally from Manhattan Beach, California, and I am a freshman at Claremont McKenna College dual majoring in Economics and Mathematics with a sequence in Data Science. I have been doing Model United Nations since high school, and I am a member of CMC's MUN team. In my free time, I enjoy going to Claremont Village, playing intramural sports, and playing poker with my friends.

The African Union is one of the most important bodies in the world, and the topics we will be debating at McKennaMUN VIII -- Outside Economic Influences and Terrorism -- affect the over one billion people on the continent, and both topics involve a variety of international issues without having a clear solution. In my five years of doing MUN, I have had the opportunity to meet so many incredible people and travel the world -- in fact, I have been to England, France, Thailand, and Cambodia for MUN trips! MUN has meant so much to me, and I look forward to helping each of you love MUN just as much as I do. If you have any questions, please feel free to reach out -- I am happy to help. I cannot wait to meet you all, and I look forward to a fantastic weekend of debate at McKennaMUN VIII.

Sincerely,

Sam Bogen

Director, African Union

COMMITTEE INTRODUCTION:

The African Union is a body consisting of 55 member states from the continent of Africa and its surrounding islands.² Its vision is for “an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.”³ The African Union seeks to integrate all of Africa on several different fronts over the course of many years. While the African Union used to primarily support liberation movements from colonialism and brutal regimes when it was known as the Organization of African Unity between 1963 and 1999, since its official re-establishment as the African Union in 2002, the AU has sought to help be a leader in Africa’s prosperity.

The African Union seeks to help add value by working closely with African Union member states and their citizens on integration and development as a continent. As a committee, its goals are directly stated as follows: “

- Respect for diversity and teamwork;
- Think Africa above all;
- Transparency and accountability;
- Integrity and impartiality;
- Efficiency and professionalism;
- Information and knowledge sharing.”⁵

Keeping these values in mind will be absolutely vital for all delegates in the committee, even those who may be representing non-AU members.

HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE:

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in May of 1963 when 32 leaders of independent African nations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Africa's first continental institution, the OAU sought a united and free continent that controlled its own fate. The OAU's main objectives were to stop all colonization and apartheid in Africa and to promote unity and development among African nations. The OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa worked diligently on ending colonialization and apartheid across the continent, and it provided a unified voice against colonialism and apartheid and enabled all members of the OAU to have one coordinated stance on the issue. On September 9, 1999, the OAU issued the Sirte Declaration, which called for the establishment of an African Union, which would focus more on Africa's integration into the global economy while also working on different problems socially, economically, and politically regarding globalization.⁶

The African Union (AU) was launched in Durban, South Africa in July of 2002, almost three years after the Sirte Declaration. The AU is motivated by a vision of "An Integrated, Prosperous and Peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in

the global arena.”⁷ One of the first documents affirmed by the AU was the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which laid out the aims and goals of the AU, and its inaugural pan-African parliament met in March 2004. In 2015, the AU laid out Africa’s Agenda 2063, which pushes for greater collaboration and support for works and initiatives that are led by African nations and work to meet the aspirations of the African people.⁸

TOPIC 1: OUTSIDE ECONOMIC INFLUENCES

Topic Introduction:

Africa has been subject to outside economic influence since the sixth century BCE. Since then, numerous countries and entities have tried to exert economic influence over African nations through colonialism, military efforts, multilateral trade agreements, and development initiatives. As a result of a long time dependence on outside economic influence and support, Africa’s development has lagged behind that of other parts of the world such as Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East.

As Africa begins to rapidly catch up to the rest of the world in terms of development and economic capability on the international stage, its nations have become far less dependent on outside support. Despite this, in the past few years, notable agreements such as several African nations’ involvement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative have led to renewed questions about

Africa's economic independence. As the African Union continues to work on integration and development for its member states, the committee must contend with the helpful and harmful effects of outside economic influence.

Topic History:

The first instance of outside economic influence in Africa was the mercantile trading colony of Naukratis, approximately 50 miles outside of Alexandria, Egypt. The Greeks established Naukratis as an emporium, a trading station with exclusive-to-Greece trading rights in Egypt.⁹ As they did with many other emporia, the Greeks took slaves from Egypt and made them available in market places across the Mediterranean Sea, and they traded many luxury goods without the Egyptians getting much in return.¹⁰ This pattern continued over the next several hundred years, with the Romans taking over most of North Africa and founding 19 different colonies, mostly in modern Tunisia. In fact, the Romans created some conditions that led to economic benefit for Africans, and the Roman emperor Septimus Severus, who served in the second century CE, was born in Leptis Magna, part of modern Libya. However, as time progressed, Roman influence in North Africa declined, and Germanic Vandals took over and pillaged the area. By the time that the Arabs had taken over North Africa in 697 CE, the first era of mutually beneficial relations between Africa and the rest of the world had ended.¹¹

Although the Arabs, Catholics, and several other groups had territory in North Africa over the ensuing several hundred years, the next significant development regarding outside economic


influence on the continent came in the nineteenth century. By then, the slave trade with the Americas had been running in full force, and resources were steadily being plundered. However, all of this would pale in comparison to European colonialism of African nations.

During the mid-1800's, European nations began to view Africa as a major source of natural resources and potential wealth. This led to a scramble for European colonies in Africa, and as this push for territory began to heighten, fifteen European nations met in 1884 at the Berlin West Africa Conference.¹² The conference, however, only set the rules for European nations regarding colonization of Africa. It set no guidelines as to how the African people were to be treated, and it set no guidelines on how to ensure economic equality for the colonies. The Berlin West Africa Conference declared the Congo River basin to be a neutral territory, banned slave trading, and guaranteed freedom for all states in the Congo River basin by rejecting Portugal's claims to the area. These were key reasons why the Congo Free State, which Britain, France, and Germany had all previously agreed to, was founded and ruled by King Leopold II.¹³

During the colonial period, Africa was neither connected nor economically independent. While colonialism enabled significant European investment and transportation improvements, all of these changes were intended for purely European benefit. For example, the railways were only to get natural resources from the interior of the continent to the coastal ports for export to other markets. Essentially, while the Berlin West Africa Conference may have abolished slavery, it was only replaced with other forced labor practices. Trade increased significantly during the

colonial era (see Figure 1), but this trade boom turned into a long bust shortly after. By 1940, Africa's terms of trade had returned to its levels between 1800 and 1820.

Figure 1¹⁵



After World War II ended, the geopolitical landscape began to shift towards global decolonization. In 1955, representatives from the governments of 29 African and Asian nations met at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia to discuss the role of the “Third World” during the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union as well as to discuss their dissatisfaction about several decolonization-related issues.¹⁶ Between 1945 and 1960, over three dozen African nations were created, and by 1965, 38 African nations had gained United Nations membership. However, European nations continued to fight to maintain influence over their former colonies. For example, Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola were at war with Portugal, and the strain from Dutch colonization on South Africa led to the creation of the Apartheid state that crippled the nation until the late twentieth century. Moreover, the former British colonies struggled for

funding despite the British Colonial Development Acts. Britain planned to spend \$220 million on its former colonies in West Africa, but this would only amount to approximately \$7 per capita.¹⁷ The legacy of colonization overall left Africa economically lagging behind a large portion of the world.

Figure 2¹⁸



All of this has left many African nations dependent on outside economic influence, leading many African nations to seek ways to increase their economic independence. In 1991, the Abuja Treaty was signed, establishing the African Economic Community (AEC). The AEC breaks down Africa into groups of regional economic communities (RECs), which include the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of

Central African States (ECCAS), Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Abuja Treaty was to be implemented over 34 years, culminating in 2028 with the integration of all trade systems in place.¹⁹ While some of the steps outlined in the Abuja Treaty have been successful, it was largely overshadowed by the breakdown of the OAU and the formation of the African Union.

Today, Africa is at a unique point in its development. By 2030, Africa is projected to have \$6.7 trillion in consumer and business spending, and this number will only increase in the future -- offering a great opportunity for international investment. In 2019, all African nations signed the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), which created the world's largest free trade area. In fact, the UN Commission for Africa has estimated that the AfCFTA could increase intra-African trade by 52 percent within the next three years -- a huge step towards economic independence. While some outside investment may be necessary to continue to build infrastructure and continue continental development, it remains to be seen how much African nations will seek economic independence or continue to rely on outside influences for help, such as continued foreign aid from the United States, France, and China.²⁰

The Issue:

While the AfCFTA is a fantastic start towards figuring out just how much African nations want to rely on outside economic influence and aid, there is far more work to be done. Even as

intra-African trade increases along with trade with the rest of the world, significant hurdles remain to be cleared. African nations continue to rely on agriculture and commodities as their main exports because of a slow or nonexistent industrialization process. This has meant that export diversification has not yet occurred, and as of 2019, intra-African trade is only 16% of the total trade in Africa. The committee, therefore, must figure out how to balance outside economic influences, and the demands for geopolitical influence that accompany them, with the need for African economic independence and the steady and continued growth of the continent.

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Agenda 2063, announced in 2013, set a fifty-year master plan to help bolster Africa's economy and help the continent become a major economic player on the global stage. It provides a framework for development, economic independence, progress, and prosperity pushed for by the Pan-African and the African Renaissance movements. Agenda 2063 was created because African leaders realized the collective need to refocus Africa's priorities from those of the Organization of African Unity -- defeating apartheid and gaining political independence from outside powers to those of the African Union, which focuses on social and economic development along with integration for African nations. All actions that the African Union takes at the current time are in the context of Agenda 2063, so the committee must keep this in mind as potential solutions to the issue are debated.²¹

Agenda 2063 addresses several key economic issues that will shape the future of the African continent. One issue is economic subjugation, to which Agenda 2063 states that all

remnants of colonialism will have ended by 2020. It is up to the committee to decide if any cases of outside economic subjugation of Africans remain, and if so, how to deal with them as this 2020 deadline rapidly approaches. In addition, Agenda 2063 pushes for further intra-African trade, just as the AfCFTA accomplishes, as well as using economic transformation as a source for intra-African peace instead of further conflict. Finally, Agenda 2063 calls for pushes to be made to help raise portions of their population out of poverty, just has been done in the past. It does not, however, indicate if outside help should be used to help accomplish this -- be that through aid grants or loans. The African Union remains confident that Agenda 2063 will meet the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the agenda calls for African Union nations to work directly with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) to assist. While the UN has recognized Agenda 2063 as important, very few concrete actions have been taken to directly help accomplish Agenda 2063's goals.²²

One of the most important developments with this issue is the rise of China's Belt and Road Initiative. In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. These projects help develop infrastructure and invest in nations in East and Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The project eventually became known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and it also involves creating a set of ports that allow for a trade network for China along the Indian Ocean.²³

Figure 3²⁴

As of 2019, more than sixty countries are a part of the BRI, which includes for two-thirds of the global population. However, there are some experts who view the BRI as a power grab by China, due to the debt to China that they are putting on the developing countries. China provides nations with low-interest loans instead of aid grants, which means that BRI nations are required to eventually pay China back for the funds provided to them for the projects. Some of these projects have required that Chinese firms be used for the construction, leading to inflated costs, canceled projects, and potential pushback from citizens and politicians alike. In fact, many countries, including some in the African Union like Zambia, have seen politicians come to office on an Anti-BRI platform.²⁵ As of September 2019, 40 African nations had signed on to the BRI,

with only the Democratic Republic of the Congo not signed on out of the 10 most populous nations on the continent. ²⁶ In fact, China signed a memorandum of understanding directly with the African Union regarding the AU's commitment to the BRI in the context of Agenda 2063. ²⁷

An important case with Africa's involvement in the BRI is that of Djibouti. Although Djibouti has a population of only 884,000 people and is one of the smallest nations in the world, it serves as a vital test to outside influence for other African nations to learn from. For years, Djibouti had been a staunch ally to the United States of America, part of the United States African Command (AFRICOM) along with many other African nations. The United States had helped protect Djibouti in exchange for Djibouti allowing the United States to have a naval base on Djiboutian soil. However, in recent years, China has leveraged its debt that Djibouti owes them -- Djibouti owes China approximately 80% of its total debt, largely due to China's investment in Djibouti as part of the BRI but also due to China's weapons sales and other financial loans provided to Djibouti -- to take control of many Djiboutian ports because Djibouti has been unable to pay back some of the debt owed to China. While Djiboutian officials continue to believe that they will be able to pay off the rest of their debts (and they have a good track record of paying back their loans), China will still own several ports and one third of all infrastructure investments in Djibouti. The situation in Djibouti has caused fear in many other African countries of China asserting similar control if the countries are unable to pay off the debt owed to China as a result of the BRI. While Chinese investment may help with the goals of integration and development in Africa, it also brings with it the concerns of dependence on

outside sources for economic development and fears of control and power grabs as time goes on.

Despite the notoriety of the Belt and Road Initiative, China is not the only country with significant economic ties to Africa. While China directly invested \$72.23 billion in Africa between 2014 and 2018, the United States, France, and the United Arab Emirates all combined to directly invest \$90.40 billion into the continent. In 2018, Egypt received the most foreign direct investment at \$12 billion, with Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, Morocco, and Zimbabwe all receiving more than \$5 billion each in foreign direct investment.²⁹ In fact, many countries in Africa tend to rely on foreign aid, despite Africa's overall economic growth being faster than that of the rest of the world (expanding by about 10% annually since 2004). For example, in Ethiopia, despite the nation having one of the fastest growing economies in the world since 1985, almost one third of the nation's population earn less than \$1 per day, and it receives billions in foreign aid every year. In fact, in 2011 and 2012, Ethiopia was the UK's single biggest recipient of foreign aid. Ethiopia, for its part, has been working on a significant economic development program that matches the African Union's ambitions, but its struggles reveal an underlying problem that is not shown by the African continent's strong economic growth numbers. The strong growth rates mask that although the upper middle class and upper class continue to get wealthy, the wealth gap in Africa has started to increase, and in several countries, the poor are not escaping poverty as quickly as many would have hoped.³⁰

While its history of colonialism continues to be a lingering fear for African leaders regarding European investment and aid to African nations, the European Union has been a major economic influence on the continent. In 2007, the African Union and European Union agreed to the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, which has led the EU to work in partnership with African nations rather than as a wealthy power. This has led to increased two-way trade between the two parties; in fact, when the fifth EU-Africa Summit occurred in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, two-way trade between the EU and African nations was over \$300 billion. During the summit, the EU pledged over \$54 billion in “sustainable investment” by 2020, and with this wave of investment coming to an end within the next year, it is up to the committee to decide the direction it wants to take with the European Union.³¹


The United States and Africa’s economic relations have been based upon the 2000 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a one-way trade agreement for the United States that allows for 40 out of the 54 African nations to have duty-free access for over 6,000 American products. However, since this is a one-way agreement, many African countries have pushed for a need to negotiate a multilateral trade agreement with the United States, and while the AGOA has led to dialogue between the United States and African Union, the United States has preferred to bypass the African Union in favor of working with a select few countries, namely South Africa, Lesotho, Kenya, Mauritius, and Ethiopia due to their large amount of exports to the United States. As China and the European Union continue to use more successful trade strategies in Africa, the time has come for the African Union to negotiate a new set of trade

guidelines with the United States, especially considering that the United States has lost some leverage due to China's heavy involvement in Africa and the increase in investment from other nations.³²


Ultimately, the committee will need to weigh the benefits of outside economic influences with the costs of having large amounts of debt owed to nations like China and continuing to not be completely economically independent. The committee must balance the African Union's stated desire for economic independence with the need for foreign investment to help with growth, and it must seek out necessary partnerships that will allow for the best way forward for African nations. Creative strategies are needed in order to balance the tense relations between the United States and China as a third party, and the committee must discover a way to move forward on previously existing agreements while still looking ahead with Agenda 2063.

Key Actors:


As outlined in the Abuja Treaty, the African Economic Community is broken down into eight different regional economic communities (RECs): the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Figure 4: Map of ECOWAS Countries³⁴


The Economic Community of West African States consists of the following nations: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Most countries in this region are still aligned from their colonial boundaries, which means that cultural and ethnic boundaries are largely ignored and dividing one ethnic group over multiple nations.³⁵ ECOWAS emphasizes regional integration and cooperation as tools for economic development, as well as being the best means to maintaining sustainable development. In 2007, ECOWAS introduced ECOWAS Vision 2020, which attempted to set goals for economic development within that 13-year period. With Vision 2020 ending in a year, it is important that ECOWAS nations work to find a solution that can combine outside influence with the community's fundamental goals of cooperation, equality of member states, solidarity, and regional integration.^{36 37}

Figure 5: Map of CENSAD Countries³⁸

The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD) has the following member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia..³⁹ CENSAD was established in 1998 and works on common actions in politics, culture, and economics. The community emphasizes freedom of movement and property rights, along with free trade. For free trade agreements, CENSAD emphasizes external trade through investment policies. Additionally, CENSAD has an objective for common transportation and communications projects.⁴⁰

Figure 6: Map of COMESA Countries⁴¹

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) currently includes the following countries: Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Seychelles, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. COMESA seeks to maintain sustainable economic development using natural and human resources, as well as working on joint development projects. COMESA is currently working on creating a system for joint promotion of research for development purposes, and it holds a common position regarding international economic policy. COMESA has also established several institutions to help reach the bloc's goals as well as to support the nations' private sectors.⁴²

Figure 7: Map of ECCAS Countries⁴³

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) consists of the following countries: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe. ECCAS nations work to cooperate in order to achieve self-sustained development with a goal of economic independence. ECCAS aims to raise standards of living and maintain economic stability. ECCAS also emphasizes removing trade barriers and working with outside parties to establish trade policies and agreements for freedom of movement of goods and services.⁴⁴

Figure 8: Map of IGAD Countries ⁴⁵



The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. Rather than focus on drought and desertification in the Horn of Africa as its predecessor did, IGAD works to expand cooperation between member states in order to achieve food security, environmental protection, and economic integration. IGAD views food security as a vital part of any economic policy and seeks to improve infrastructure in its member states. ⁴⁶

Figure 9: Map of EAC Countries⁴⁷

The East African Community (EAC) includes Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania. The EAC has five goals that it wants to establish through economic cooperation: a customs union, a common market, a monetary union, and a political federation of member states. The community also seeks to consolidate markets between countries that could potentially raise the standard of living in member states as well as working on partnerships with the private sector to bolster the economies of member states. However, the EAC member states do not have to have common policies regarding trade and economic independence.⁴⁸

Figure 10: Map of SADC Countries ⁴⁹

The Southern African Development Community (SADC), headquartered in Botswana, includes Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The SADC seeks to develop inter-dependence on each of the member states, so it is important that each member state works to complement other member states' programs. In addition, the SADC focuses on sustainable use of natural resources, be that for internal use or for exportation. SADC nations collectively have an almost-even import to export ratio, helping them in their push for bilateral trade deals. ⁵⁰

Figure 11: Map of AMU Countries ⁵¹

The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) consists of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. The AMU seeks to defend each nation's rights while strengthening "the ties of brotherhood" between each member state and pushing for policies that enable their main goal of trade liberalization. In the past, the AMU has sought a continental free trade area for all African nations, but so far these efforts have been unsuccessful. Recently, the AMU has had to deal with political instability due to the Arab Spring, which has hampered its ability to work on furthering its agenda. ⁵²

Looking Ahead:

At this point in time, African Union member states must make a decision regarding economic independence. If nations seek to become economically independent as has been

previously discussed by the African Union, then it is up to the committee to determine how third parties should contribute to that independence. The African Union has already created the world's largest free trade area with the AfCFTA, but the committee must decide what to commit to regarding foreign investment. Recently, the African Union has promised to explore further partnership opportunities with China, a move that is bound to anger the United States, which has taken a stand against China under President Donald Trump.⁵³ In addition to the delicate balancing act between two world powers, African Union members should work on accomplishing the goals outlined in Agenda 2063 in order to continue with the African Union's broader goals of economic development and integration.

Furthermore, committee members should evaluate how foreign investment fits into the long-term plan. Potential solutions should determine whether this investment should come through the private or public sector, and whether it should be in the form of foreign direct investment, aid, loans, or another form of investment altogether. In addition, members should balance any need for outside economic influences with any social, political, and cultural repercussions that such influence may cause. Many African Union member states have also voiced concerns about corruption, and outside economic influence may only cause further friction in this regard.⁵⁴

The Abuja Treaty also helped break down the continent into smaller economic blocs (RECs), each of which has their own goals and should work to find a solution that helps the entire continent while still benefiting the individual REC. As stated in the African Union's mission, the

committee must “Think Africa above all” in any potential solution, and the wellbeing of the African people should be prioritized above all else.⁵⁵

Questions to Consider:

1. What in particular -- foreign investment, aid, loans, trade agreements, infrastructure projects, private sector involvement, military involvement, constitutes outside economic influence?
2. In what ways can African nations optimize the types of foreign investment that comes into Africa, and how can this foreign investment be balanced with the previously stated desire for economic independence?
3. How should member states work to keep the needs of their regional economic communities in mind while still prioritizing “Africa above all else”?
4. How can committee members address the rise in economic tensions between the United States and China, the two countries responsible for the most foreign investment into Africa?

Further Reading:

[Agenda 2063 \(Popular Version\)](#)⁵⁶

[China and the United States face off in Djibouti as the world powers fight for influence in Africa](#)

[\(CNN\)](#)⁵⁷

[Foreign Direct Investment in Africa \(Brookings\)](#) ⁵⁸

[What a new scramble could mean for Africans \(The Washington Post\)](#) ⁵⁹

[The \\$2.5 trillion African economy: Why a borderless Africa offers best hope for unleashing the continent's potential \(UNCTAD\)](#) ⁶⁰

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¹⁹ “African Economic Community (AEC).” Accessed December 25, 2019.

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²¹ “Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. | African Union.” Accessed December 26, 2019.

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²³ Council on Foreign Relations. “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative.” Accessed December 26, 2019. <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative>.

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TOPIC 2: TERRORISM

Topic Introduction:

The standard definition of terrorism, according to the United Nations, is “Any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”⁶¹ This definition is disputed because many countries, including some African Union member states, have pushed back and said that violent attacks to resist occupation should not be classified as terrorism.⁶² However, no matter what its definition is, there is no doubt that terrorism must be combatted, particularly in Africa.

Within Africa, several terrorist groups have gained power since the turn of the millennium, most notably Boko Haram, based in Nigeria, and al-Shabaab, based in Somalia. These groups, coupled with other smaller factions and allies, have led to mass civilian casualties, damage of property, and displacement and movement of people between countries. Therefore, while the committee will ideally find a way to help those affected by terrorism across the continent, it must first and foremost focus on working on counter-terrorism against the groups operating in Africa, particularly the two largest groups on the continent in Boko Haram and al-Shabaab.⁶³

Topic History:

Terrorism has existed far before the 21st century. In fact, many believe that actions that would constitute terrorism in today's world go as far back as Roman times, with the perpetrators of these actions attempting to make a statement to the Romans and their Jewish collaborators. Another early example of terrorism were the Assassins, a breakoff group from a Shia Muslim sect called the Ismailis. Operating during the 1000s, the Assassins stabbed their victims (usually public figures who would not adopt the version of Islam that the Assassins wanted them to) in public and in broad daylight. Early religious extremism was not just limited to the Muslims, though. The Thuggees were an Indian religious extremist group who strangled random travelers so to appease the Hindu goddess of destruction between the seventh and nineteenth centuries -- murdering over 1,000,000 people in the process. However, religion is not the only basis for terrorist actions -- terrorism was used as part of the French revolution in the late 18th century as well as being used for Russian nationalists who opposed the Czars in the late 19th century.⁶⁴

In Africa, terrorism particularly rose to prevalence in the past 50 years. In the 1960s and 1970s, nationalistic terrorist groups in Kenya and Algeria emerged as anti-colonial movements gained steam in those respective nations.⁶⁵ However, just as those movements were considered terrorism, other movements across Africa during the late twentieth century were also looked at by outsiders as terrorism. One such group was the African National Congress in South Africa, for which Nelson Mandela was on the United States terrorist watch lists until 2008.⁶⁶ While many

nations now consider several of these actions to have been at least somewhat justified, many of the terrorist groups that exist today are armed militias that have combined the nationalistic tendencies of modern terrorist movements with the religious extremism that accompanied historical terrorist groups -- an extremely dangerous mix.

One of the most prominent terrorist groups in Africa, Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by Muhammed Yusuf as an Islamist movement in the northeastern part of Nigeria. Boko Haram is Hausa for “Westernization is Sacrilege”; this name was given to the group, originally named Jamā‘at Ahl al-Sunnah li-l-Da‘awah wa al-Jihād, by outsiders based on Boko Haram’s views and teachings. The group blames the west for having a negative impact on Islamic values and for the huge wealth gap in Nigeria. Boko Haram originally claimed to want to impose Sharia law and end corruption and injustice within Nigeria, blaming these on westernization.⁶⁷

In 2009, Boko Haram escalated its actions with a set of attacks on police stations and government buildings in Nigeria, which killed many police officers. As a response, the Nigerian army was deployed, with more than 700 Boko Haram members killed in the ensuing operation and Muhammed Yusuf arrested. A few days later, Yusuf and his father’s corpses, both clearly having been shot, were displayed in public. This enraged Boko Haram members, but no further attacks occurred until September 2010, when members attacked a prison in Bauchi. In 2011, a Boko Haram suicide bomber attacked the United Nations building in Abuja, the Nigerian capital, killing 23 and injuring over one hundred others. In 2012, 185 people were killed after a set of Boko Haram attacks on police stations and government buildings in Kano.⁶⁸

As time progressed, Boko Haram began to expand its network. According to reports, Boko Haram began operating in Cameroon in 2013, and links were reported between Boko Haram, al-Qaeda, and al-Shabaab. In 2014, the United Nations took its first action against Boko Haram, imposing sanctions against individuals in and associated with the group, as well as freezing assets and issuing embargos and travel bans to the aforementioned individuals. However, this action had little to no effect on the group. A major shift in the fight against Boko Haram occurred in early 2015 when a coalition of African Union countries led by Nigeria managed to kick Boko Haram out of much of its territory. By March 2015, Boko Haram had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), but this pledge led the group to split in 2016. Today, committee members must find ways to counter both ISWA (the Boko Haram faction that is tied to ISIL), as well as the new version of Boko Haram post-split.⁶⁹

Al-Shabaab was founded in 2004 as a militia group affiliated with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a group of clan-driven Islamic courts throughout southern Somalia. Originally created to combat the lack of laws in the region, al-Shabaab began working as the militant wing of the ICU by late 2004, and they recruited fighters from al-Qaeda affiliates as well as other Somali extremist groups. This led al-Shabaab to push for a puritan version of Islam, far more extreme than that of the ICU. In 2006, the United States covertly supported Somali warlords in a combat battle against al-Shabaab in the Somali capital of Mogadishu. However, the ICU took control of Mogadishu by June 2006. By the end of 2006, al-Shabaab had survived while the new version of the ICU had been defeated, leading al-Shabaab to become even more violent.⁷⁰

In 2007, al-Shabaab attacked civilians, journalists, and aid workers in Somalia, along with African Union peacekeeping forces deployed by the United Nations Security Council. Although in 2008 the Somali government took steps that al-Shabaab supported in the removal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia, al-Shabaab continued to expand and escalate, imposing a tyrannical rule in its territory. Al-Shabaab went international in 2010, bombing a FIFA World Cup viewing party in Kampala, Uganda. African Union peacekeeping forces began to wear down al-Shabaab by 2011, leading the group to retreat from Mogadishu and move south. In late 2011, thousands of Kenyan soldiers entered Somalia and attacked al-Shabaab as a response to kidnappings in Kenya. The Kenyan force merged with AMISOM (the African Union peacekeepers in Somalia). In 2012, al-Shabaab formally became part of the al-Qaeda network, and in 2013, al-Shabaab held 65 hostages in a Nairobi shopping mall for several days. In 2015, al-Shabaab attacked a Kenyan university, killing over 100 people and injuring many more.⁷¹ Despite previous efforts not being completely successful, AMISOM began a gradual withdrawal from Somalia in 2017, but the UN Security Council delayed this withdrawal due to fears that the Somali government might completely collapse without an AMISOM presence in the country.⁷²

Although Boko Haram and al-Shabaab are arguably the two most prominent terrorist groups in Africa, several more groups exist. One group is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, based largely out of Algeria, which has existed since the twentieth century under several different names, generally as a jihadist militant group throughout the Maghreb region in North Africa.⁷³ Other groups include the Fulani in Nigeria, the Bachama in Nigeria, and other al-Qaeda

and Islamic State affiliates throughout Africa.⁷⁴ Ultimately, the committee must find solutions that can work to combat these violent and extremist organizations in order to save civilian lives as well as billions of dollars of property damage.

The Issue:

Although work has been done by several actors, the issue of stopping terrorist groups in Africa is far from complete. 2020 brings an important crossroads to the African Union's fight against terrorism. The fight will be on multiple fronts, and it is absolutely necessary that the committee finds a solution that takes steps to rid the continent of all terrorism while also protecting and helping those who have been harmed by such groups.

As previously stated, one of the most important regions in the fight against terrorism is going to be within Somalia and Kenya as the committee works to fight against al-Shabaab. The group is clearly still active and striking key international targets, as evidenced by al-Shabaab taking responsibility for both the January 5, 2020 strike against the United States Manda Bay Military Airfield outside of Lamu, Kenya that killed three American government personnel along with five al-Shabaab attackers along with a December 29, 2019 strike in Mogadishu, Somalia that killed over 78 civilians.^{75 76} These attacks have led the United States military to become more involved, conducting three airstrikes in coordination with Somalia's government.⁷⁷

Both al-Shabaab's recent attacks along with the United States' increased involvement pose further questions about the capabilities of the African Union peacekeeping forces. United


Nations experts believe that al-Shabaab has gained the capability to make their own improvised explosive devices, after previously only relying on explosives and ammunition that were stolen from the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM).⁷⁸ These opinions were part of the reason that the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2498 by a vote of twelve for, none against, and three abstentions (Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, and China). The resolution renews the arms embargo against Somalia until December 15, 2020, and it added bans on charcoal and ingredients for the al-Shabaab manufactured explosives.⁷⁹

While Resolution 2498 is an important step in the battle against al-Shabaab, it cannot be one of the only actions taken. Although AMISOM has been somewhat successful in bringing some stability to Somalia, it is far from being able to stand alone. Despite the increase in attacks in 2019 from al-Shabaab, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to lower the ceiling for the amount of AMISOM troops in Somalia by 1000 troops as part of the 2017 plan to transfer security in Somalia to Somali government forces -- a plan that has been criticized by both experts and some African Union leaders. While AMISOM has ensured that al-Shabaab does not have any definite strongholds in Mogadishu, the group continues to carry out attacks in and around the Somali capital. While the African Union runs AMISOM, all AMISOM operations must be approved by the United Nations Security Council -- thus, this committee can only recommend actions to the United Nations Security Council that concern AMISOM.

Another issue particularly important to the fight against al-Shabaab is how it will impact relations with non-African Union countries. For example, the United States is currently providing

military aid to AMISOM, largely because the United States maintains economic and commercial interests on the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia and Kenya. Therefore, it is in the United States’ best interests to continue fighting against al-Shabaab. However, under the direction of President Donald Trump, the United States has repeatedly reportedly explored removing military support in the region, and although the United States is the non-African Union country with the most involvement in the region, other non-African Union nations have commercial ties in the region that will be affected by how the fight against al-Shabaab evolves.⁸⁰ In the end, the committee must continue to curb al-Shabaab’s influence while keeping in mind the issues of continental relations, sovereignty, and military control in mind.

Figure 12⁸¹



As previously stated, Boko Haram split into two factions in 2016. One faction remains called Boko Haram, and it is led by Abubakar Shekau. The other faction is commonly referred to as the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, but at times both factions have been collectively referred to as “Boko Haram,” leading to some confusion as to which group was responsible for a particular attack.⁸² Like al-Shabaab, Boko Haram (the post-split group that maintained the original name) has launched several recent attacks, including an attack on a market that killed thirty people and injured more than 35 other civilians near the Nigeria-Cameroon border on January 7, 2020, as well as abducting 7 travelers near Maiduguri, Nigeria, on January 9, 2020.^{83 84} In addition to these actions by the Boko Haram faction, ISWA claimed responsibility for the execution of 11 Nigerian Christians. These executions are particularly notable because the initial reason that ISWA split from Boko Haram was that it strongly disapproved of the violence against Muslims that was being instituted by Boko Haram; however, experts suspect that the executions mean that the more violent methods of Boko Haram may be returning to ISWA in the wake of the murder of ISIL (the parent group of ISWA) leader Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2019 in Syria. All of these actions reflect the increase in violence throughout the north of Nigeria in 2019 and carrying over into 2020, leaving a humanitarian issue to be solved. ISWA has expanded beyond just Nigeria, however -- on December 24, 2019, ISWA claimed responsibility for an attack in Burkina Faso that killed seven soldiers.⁸⁵

Interestingly, there is neither a United Nations nor an African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Nigeria. The nearest United Nations Peacekeeping Missions to Boko Haram territory is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (which is unrelated to the issues that face Nigeria), and the nearest mission to ISWA territory is in Mali, which, while dealing with another ISIL affiliate in the Islamic State in Greater Sahara, does not fight against ISWA since that faction is currently in Mali.⁸⁶

The lack of peacekeeping mission has meant that other methods have been used in the fight against both Boko Haram and ISWA. With regard to Boko Haram, the Nigerian military has acted with support from Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger in the Borno state in northern Nigeria. However, the region's military action has displaced millions of people, and these security forces have been accused of significant human rights abuses -- an issue the committee must grapple with. While Boko Haram clearly does not abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the lack of human rights on the military side could cause an international issue when looking for support to help with the fight against Boko Haram. The Nigerian military has also been active in the fight against ISWA, which has mainly focused on attacking military targets in Nigeria until recently, when terrorists struck in the border regions between Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Mali.⁸⁷

The international community is unsure which terrorist group is responsible for the border regions attacks. While most reports indicate that the three attacks in the border regions were carried out by the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS), there have been reports of some

overlap between ISGS and ISWA because ISWA claims some ISGS attacks. This has made it difficult to figure out exactly which attacks were carried out by ISWA and which attacks are simply being claimed by ISWA but were actually carried out by ISGS. Geographically, most attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger are usually attributed to ISGS, and attacks in and around the Lake Chad Basin are attributed to ISWA. However, the distinctions between the two groups are certainly less clear than they were in the past. Abu Musab al-Barnawi, one of the leaders of ISWA, has been reportedly relocating some ISWA cells near where ISGS operates in Niger.⁸⁸

Besides ISWA, ISGS, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab, a strategy must be taken by the committee to work on countering several other smaller terrorists groups across the African continent. Two other Islamic State affiliates exist in Africa -- the Islamic State of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (ISISSTU); and the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS). ISS has very little territory as of 2019 (see Figure 12) and is a splinter group off of al-Shabaab. However, ISISSTU has recorded several attacks in the past few years, most notably an attack on AMISOM in 2016. There has also been some fighting between ISISSTU and al-Shabaab, as the al-Qaeda linked al-Shabaab has been reported to be killing ISISSTU defectors.⁸⁹ Another terrorist group is the Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which along with other al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel region have been responsible for several attacks. The Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda still maintains some presence, but it is not nearly as significant as it was several years ago. Ultimately, the committee must develop a counter-terrorism strategy that works to fight terrorist insurgencies

across the continent while still respecting national sovereignty, human rights, and the millions of people who are displaced by terrorist groups.

Key Actors:

Each particular region in Africa has its own priorities in the fight against terrorism. While some regions are mostly terrorism-free, the majority of countries in Africa are currently dealing with some sort of terrorist group. This leaves the battle against terrorism largely region by region, with some overlap and some broad plans through the African Union.


One region that has become increasingly important is the Sahel region (see Figure 13). Countries such as Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad have had a recent influx of violence from terrorism, much of which has been helped by weapons from Libya and returning extreme Jihadist Muslims coming back from Syria and Iraq after a string of ISIL defeats. The terrorists in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad mainly belong to ISGS, and very little effort has been made to contain them outside of Mali. In addition, some al-Qaeda allies are fighting against the United Nations Peacekeepers in Mali, and this violence has spread to Burkina Faso, which is experiencing its own terrorist insurgency.⁹⁰

The Sahel region also includes Nigeria, which is actively fighting against both Boko Haram and ISWA. Although Nigeria has repeatedly claimed that Boko Haram has been defeated, recent strikes indicate that the group is alive and well, and a response is therefore necessary from the international community. One of the biggest concerns with the Sahel region is that the vast

desert that it is contained in means that it is extremely difficult to fight against terrorist cells.

However, this also means that many Sahel nations are limited on natural resources, which could hurt the region's terrorist groups. Many Sahel nations are also ECOWAS members, and this union has helped with maintaining law and order in Sahel nations.⁹¹

Figure 13⁹²



The other main region in the fight against terrorism is the Horn of Africa. Comprised of Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, the Horn of Africa is a hotbed for al-Shabaab and some Islamic State fighters (the ISISKTU and ISS). Terrorist cells have been particularly difficult to fight in this region because of a plethora of reasons. Firstly, many countries in the Horn of Africa have political instability and/or do not have good relations with each other. Somalia has been going through unrest for years, and Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia do not have strong diplomatic ties, which does not allow for much international cooperation in

the fight against terrorism. Moreover, previous terrorist actions in countries such as Uganda through the Lord's Resistance Army have made their present fight more difficult because of depleted resources.⁹³ To assist with this, six African Union member states have contributed to AMISOM -- Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia.⁹⁴ The Horn of Africa has been one of the most important regions for foreign aid, with the European Union allocating over \$254 million in humanitarian support in 2017. The Horn of Africa has also developed a refugee crisis, largely due to unrest in Somalia. Fortunately, Uganda has taken in a large number of these refugees, but Kenya has continued a voluntary repatriation program in Somalia, despite drought and famine limiting the amount of people who can realistically live there.⁹⁴

Figure 14⁹⁵



There are a few other regions that will be of particular importance. West Africa remains an important player in the fight against terrorism, with their proximity to ISGS, ISWA, and Boko Haram allowing them to help in the fight against these groups. However, many West African nations fear that getting involved in the fight against groups such as Boko Haram will mean that the fight will shift to those particular nations, which leaves them in a state of limbo. In addition, several countries in Central Africa have recently focused on adopting a regional approach to fighting terrorism, particularly when it comes to working with Sahel nations. However, the region may be facing a terrorism crisis of its own soon with Boko Haram and ISWA steadily moving eastward into Cameroon.⁹⁶ Southern Africa has mostly been spared from the terror attacks that have ravaged the rest of the continent, but threats remain, particularly in SADC nations that have security and border issues. Similarly with West Africa, southern African nations have also largely stayed away from contributing to the fight against terrorist groups in other regions because of fears of retribution.⁹⁷

Looking Ahead:

Since 2018, the United States State Department's Counterterrorism Bureau has provided over \$250 million of funding to African nations to focus on four areas in the fight against terrorism -- bolstering law enforcement so they can better respond to and prevent future terrorist attacks, strengthening borders between nations so terrorists are not able to freely travel between nations, ensuring that terrorists cannot raise or move money, and anti-

radicalization. While these four categories are beneficial, they are far from a complete list. In addition, they do not even begin to discuss the humanitarian and economic side to the terrorism crisis in Africa -- with millions of people displaced from terrorist attacks across the continent, and billions of dollars of damage to property resulting from terrorist attacks, the committee must work to find solutions that deal with the issues resulting from terrorist attacks in addition to simply working to stop terrorism in the first place. The African Union passed the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in 1999, and this Convention along with the Dakar Declaration against Terrorism in 2001 and a 2004 Protocol to the 1999 convention have served as the basis for the fight against terrorism. However, it hardly does enough, and while recent resolutions have been passed, there has not been nearly enough attention paid to what is rapidly becoming one of the top priorities for African nations.⁹⁸

Even if there is a desire to work on the fight against terrorism, there are many challenges. One challenge is the constraints on financial and human resources that have handicapped Africa for years. Counter-terrorism initiatives are historically not strongly funded or resourced due to the low priority that terrorism has taken for many African Union member states. Ultimately, it has become increasingly clear over recent years that terrorism must come to the forefront of the international discussion in the African Union -- and it is up to this committee to come up with a solution.⁹⁹

Questions to Consider:

1. What actions can the committee take as an African Union to fight terrorism without violating the sovereignty of each country involved?
2. In what ways can the committee ensure that human rights are respected, even as militaries battle against terrorist groups and insurgencies?
3. To what extent do African Union member states have to help each other in the fight against terrorism, and in what ways can they help?
4. To what extent should the African Union be dependent on foreign help and support in the fight against terrorism?
5. What can and will be done to ensure that refugees throughout Africa are protected and taken care of?

Further Reading:

[United Nations Secretary-General's remarks to the African Regional High-Level Conference on Counter Terrorism and Prevention of Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism](#) ¹⁰⁰

[Terrorist Attacks Increase in Africa's Sahel, U.S. Warns \(Wall Street Journal\)](#) ¹⁰¹

[West Africa's Sahel moves to forefront of global war on terror \(Financial Times\)](#) ¹⁰²

[Somali Terror Group Al Shabab Remains Resilient Despite Setbacks \(The New York Times\)](#) ¹⁰³

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